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DEVELOPMENT

PRESS CONFERENCE OF HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE,
MOSCOW, JULY 3, 1974

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

JOINT US-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

In accordance with the agreement to hold regular US-Soviet meetings at the highest level and at the invitation, extended during the visit of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev to the USA in June 1973, the President of the United States of America and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from June 27 to July 3, 1974.

During his stay President Nixon visited, in addition to Moscow, Minsk and the Southern Coast of the Crimea.

The President of the United States and the Soviet leaders held a thorough and useful exchange of views on major aspects of relations between the USA and the USSR and on the present international situation.

On the Soviet side the talks were conducted by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet; A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; and A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

Accompanying the President of the USA and participating in the talks was Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, US Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Also taking part in the talks were:

On the American Side: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., American Ambassador to the USSR; General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant to the President; Mr. Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary; Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State; and Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

On the Soviet Side: A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; L. M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS; and G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The talks were held in a most businesslike and constructive atmosphere and were marked by a mutual desire of both Sides to continue to strengthen understanding, confidence and peaceful cooperation between them and to contribute to the strengthening of international security and world peace.

I. Progress in Improving US-Soviet Relations

Having considered in detail the development of relations between the USA and the USSR since the US-Soviet summit meeting in May 1972, both Sides noted with satisfaction that through their vigorous joint efforts they have brought about over this short period a fundamental turn toward peaceful relations and broad, mutually beneficial cooperation in the interests of the peoples of both countries and of all mankind.

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They emphasized the special importance for the favorable development of relations between the USA and the USSR of meetings of their leaders at the highest level, which are becoming established practice. These meetings provide opportunities for effective and responsible discussion, for the solution of fundamental and important bilateral questions, and for mutual contributions to the settlement of international problems affecting the interests of both countries.

Both Sides welcome the establishment of official contacts between the Congress of the US and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. They will encourage a further development of such contacts, believing that they can play an important role.

Both Sides confirmed their mutual determination to continue actively to reshape US-Soviet relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence and equal security, in strict conformity with the spirit and the letter of the agreements achieved between the two countries and their obligations under those agreements. In this connection they noted once again the fundamental importance of the joint documents adopted as a result of the summit meetings in 1972 and 1973, especially of the Basic Principles of Relations Between the USA and the USSR, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Both Sides are deeply convinced of the imperative necessity of making the process of improving US-Soviet relations irreversible. They believe that, as a result of their efforts, a real possibility has been created to achieve this goal. This will open new vistas for broad mutually beneficial cooperation, and for strengthening friendship between the American and Soviet peoples, and will thus contribute to the solution of many urgent problems facing the world.

Guided by these worthy goals, both Sides decided to continue steadfastly to apply their joint efforts -- in cooperation with other countries concerned, as appropriate -- first of all in such important fields as:

- removing the danger of war, including particularly war involving nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons;
- limiting and eventually ending the arms race especially in strategic weapons, having in mind as the ultimate objective the achievement of general and complete disarmament under appropriate international control;
- contributing to the elimination of sources of international tension and military conflict;
- strengthening and extending the process of relaxation of tensions throughout the world;
- developing broad, mutually beneficial cooperation in commercial and economic, scientific-technical and cultural fields on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, equality and noninterference in internal affairs with a view to promoting increased understanding and confidence between the peoples of both countries.

Accordingly, in the course of this summit meeting both Sides considered it possible to take new constructive steps which, they believe, will not only advance further the development of US-Soviet relations but will also make a substantial contribution to strengthening world peace and expanding international cooperation.

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II. Further Limitation of Strategic Arms and Other Disarmament Issues

Both Sides again carefully analyzed the entire range of their mutual relations connected with the prevention of nuclear war and limitation of strategic armaments. They arrived at the common view that the fundamental agreements concluded between them in this sphere continue to be effective instruments of the general improvement of US-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole. The USA and the USSR will continue strictly to fulfill the obligations undertaken in those agreements.

In the course of the talks, the two Sides had a thorough review of all aspects of the problem of limitation of strategic arms. They concluded that the Interim Agreement on offensive strategic weapons should be followed by a new agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic arms. They agreed that such an agreement should cover the period until 1985 and deal with both quantitative and qualitative limitations. They agreed that such an agreement should be completed at the earliest possible date, before the expiration of the Interim Agreement.

They hold the common view that such a new agreement would serve not only the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States but also those of a further relaxation of international tensions and of world peace.

Their delegations will reconvene in Geneva in the immediate future on the basis of instructions growing out of the summit.

Taking into consideration the interrelationship between the development of offensive and defensive types of strategic arms and noting the successful implementation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems concluded between them in May 1972, both Sides considered it desirable to adopt additional limitations on the deployment of such systems. To that end they concluded a Protocol providing for the limitation of each Side to a single deployment area for ABM systems instead of two such areas as permitted to each Side by the Treaty.

At the same time, two protocols were signed entitled "Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms" and "Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof for ABM Systems and their Components." These protocols were worked out by the Standing Consultative Commission which was established to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the Interim Agreement signed on May 26, 1972.

The two Sides emphasized the serious importance which the US and USSR also attach to the realization of other possible measures -- both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis -- in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

Having noted the historic significance of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, concluded in Moscow in 1963, to which the United States and the Soviet Union are parties, both Sides expressed themselves in favor of making the cessation of nuclear weapon tests comprehensive. Desiring to contribute to the achievement of this goal the USA and the USSR concluded, as an important step in this direction, the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests providing for the complete cessation, starting from March 31, 1976, of the tests of such weapons above an appropriate yield threshold, and for confining other underground tests to a minimum.

(MORE)

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The Parties emphasized the fundamental importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Having reaffirmed their mutual intention to observe the obligations assumed by them under that Treaty, including Article VI thereof, they expressed themselves in favor of increasing its effectiveness.

A joint statement was also signed in which the US and USSR advocate the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.

Both Sides reaffirmed their interest in an effective international agreement which would exclude from the arsenals of states such dangerous instruments of mass destruction as chemical weapons. Desiring to contribute to early progress in this direction, the USA and the USSR agreed to consider a joint initiative in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international Convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.

Both Sides are convinced that the new important steps which they have taken and intend to take in the field of arms limitation as well as further efforts toward disarmament will facilitate the relaxation of international tensions and constitute a tangible contribution to the fulfillment of the historic task of excluding war from the life of human society and thereby of ensuring world peace. The US and the USSR reaffirmed that a world disarmament conference at an appropriate time can play a positive role in this process.

III. Progress in the Settlement of International Problems

In the course of the meeting detailed discussions were held on major international problems.

Both Sides expressed satisfaction that relaxation of tensions, consolidation of peace, and development of mutually beneficial cooperation are becoming increasingly distinct characteristics of the development of the international situation. They proceed from the assumption that progress in improving the international situation does not occur spontaneously but requires active and purposeful efforts to overcome obstacles and resolve difficulties that remain from the past.

The paramount objectives of all states and peoples should be to ensure, individually and collectively, lasting security in all parts of the world, the early and complete removal of existing international conflicts and sources of tension and the prevention of new ones from arising.

The United States and the Soviet Union are in favor of the broad and fruitful economic cooperation among all states, large and small, on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit.

The United States and the Soviet Union reaffirm their determination to contribute separately and jointly to the achievement of all these tasks.

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Europe

Having discussed the development of the situation in Europe since the last American-Soviet summit meeting, both Sides noted with profound satisfaction the further appreciable advances toward establishing dependable relations of peace, good neighborliness and cooperation on the European continent.

Both Sides welcome the major contribution which the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is making to this beneficial process. They consider that substantial progress has already been achieved at the Conference on many significant questions. They believe that this progress indicates that the present stage of the Conference will produce agreed documents of great international significance expressing the determination of the participating states to build their mutual relations on a solid jointly elaborated basis. The US and USSR will make every effort, in cooperation with the other participants, to find solutions acceptable to all for the remaining problems.

Both Sides expressed their conviction that successful completion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would be an outstanding event in the interests of establishing a lasting peace. Proceeding from this assumption the USA and the USSR expressed themselves in favor of the final stage of the Conference taking place at an early date. Both Sides also proceed from the assumption that the results of the negotiations will permit the Conference to be concluded at the highest level, which would correspond to the historic significance of the Conference for the future of Europe and lend greater authority to the importance of the Conference's decisions.

Both Sides reaffirmed the lasting significance for a favorable development of the situation in Europe of the treaties and agreements concluded in recent years between European states with different social systems.

They expressed satisfaction with the admission to the United Nations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

Both Sides also stressed that the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, must continue to play a key role in ensuring stability and detente in Europe. The US and USSR consider that the strict and consistent implementation of this Agreement by all parties concerned is an essential condition for the maintenance and strengthening of mutual confidence and stability in the center of Europe.

The USA and the USSR believe that, in order to strengthen stability and security in Europe, the relaxation of political tension on this continent should be accompanied by measures to reduce military tensions.

They therefore attach importance to the current negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe, in which they are participating. The two Sides expressed the hope that these negotiations will result in concrete decisions ensuring the undiminished security of any of the parties and preventing unilateral military advantage.

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Middle East

Both Sides believe that the removal of the danger of war and tension in the Middle East is a task of paramount importance and urgency, and therefore, the only alternative is the achievement, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 338, of a just and lasting peace settlement in which should be taken into account the legitimate interests of all peoples in the Middle East, including the Palestinian people, and the right to existence of all states in the area.

As Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, the USA and the USSR consider it important that the Conference resume its work as soon as possible, with the question of other participants from the Middle East area to be discussed at the Conference. Both Sides see the main purpose of the Geneva Peace Conference, the achievement of which they will promote in every way, as the establishment of just and stable peace in the Middle East.

They agreed that the USA and the USSR will continue to remain in close touch with a view to coordinating the efforts of both countries toward a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

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Indochina

Both Sides noted certain further improvements in the situation in Indochina. In the course of the exchange of views on the situation in Vietnam both Sides emphasized that peace and stability in the region can be preserved and strengthened only on the basis of strict observance by all parties concerned of the provisions of the Paris Agreement of January 27, 1973, and the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam of March 2, 1973.

As regards Laos, they noted progress in the normalization of the situation as a result of the formation there of coalition governmental bodies. Both Sides also pronounced themselves in favor of strict fulfillment of the pertinent agreements.

Both Sides also stressed the need for an early and just settlement of the problem of Cambodia based on respect for the sovereign rights of the Cambodian people to a free and independent development without any outside interference.

Strengthening the Role of the United Nations

The United States of America and the Soviet Union attach great importance to the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining peace and security and the expansion of international cooperation. They reiterate their intention to continue their efforts toward increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations in every possible way, including in regard to peacekeeping, on the basis of strict observance of the United Nations Charter.

IV. Commercial and Economic Relations

In the course of the meeting great attention was devoted to a review of the status of and prospects for relations between the USA and the USSR in the commercial and economic field.

Both Sides reaffirmed that they regard the broadening and deepening of mutually advantageous ties in this field on the basis of equality and non-discrimination as an important part of the foundation on which the entire structure of US-Soviet relations is built. An increase in the scale of commercial and economic ties corresponding to the potentials of both countries will cement this foundation and benefit the American and Soviet peoples.

The two Sides noted with satisfaction that since the previous summit meeting US-Soviet commercial and economic relations have on the whole shown an upward trend. This was expressed, in particular, in a substantial growth of the exchange of goods between the two countries which approximated \$1.5 billion in 1973. It was noted that prospects were favorable for surpassing the goal announced in the joint US-USSR communique of June 24, 1973, of achieving a total bilateral trade turnover of \$2.3 billion during the three-year period 1973-1975. The Joint US-USSR Commercial Commission continues to provide an effective mechanism to promote the broad-scale growth of economic relations.

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The two Sides noted certain progress in the development of long-term cooperation between American firms and Soviet organizations in carrying out large-scale projects including those on a compensation basis. They are convinced that such cooperation is an important element in the development of commercial and economic ties between the two countries. The two Sides agreed to encourage the conclusion and implementation of appropriate agreements between American and Soviet organizations and firms. Taking into account the progress made in a number of specific projects, such as those concerning truck manufacture, the trade center, and chemical fertilizers, the Sides noted the possibility of concluding appropriate contracts in other areas of mutual interest, such as pulp and paper, timber, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, natural gas, the engineering industry, and the extraction and processing of high energy-consuming minerals.

Both Sides noted further development of productive contacts and ties between business circles of the two countries in which a positive role was played by the decisions taken during the previous summit meeting on the opening of a United States commercial office in Moscow and a USSR trade representation in Washington as well as the establishment of a US-Soviet Commercial and Economic Council. They expressed their desire to continue to bring about favorable conditions for the successful development of commercial and economic relations between the USA and the USSR.

Both Sides confirmed their interest in bringing into force at the earliest possible time the US-Soviet trade agreement of October 1972.

Desirous of promoting the further expansion of economic relations between the two countries, the two Sides signed a Long-Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation between the USA and the USSR. They believe that a consistent implementation of the cooperation embodied in the Agreement over the ten-year period will be an important factor in strengthening bilateral relations in general and will benefit the peoples of both countries.

Having reviewed the progress in carrying out the Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters concluded in October 1972 for a period of three years, and based on the experience accumulated thus far, the two Sides expressed themselves in favor of concluding before its expiration a new agreement in this field. Negotiations concerning such an agreement will commence this year.

V. Progress in Other Fields of Bilateral Relations

Having reviewed the progress in the implementation of the cooperative agreements concluded in 1972-1973, both Sides noted the useful work done by joint American-Soviet committees and working groups established under those agreements in developing regular contacts and cooperation between scientific and technical organizations, scientists, specialists and cultural personnel of both countries.

The two Sides note with satisfaction that joint efforts by the USA and USSR in such fields of cooperation as medical science and public health, protection and improvement of man's environment, science and technology, exploration of outer space and the world ocean, peaceful uses of atomic energy, agriculture and transportation create conditions for an accelerated solution of some urgent and complicated problems facing mankind.

Such cooperation makes a substantial contribution to the development of the structure of American-Soviet relations, giving it a more concrete positive content.

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Both Sides will strive to broaden and deepen their cooperation in science and technology as well as cultural exchanges on the basis of agreements concluded between them.

On the basis of positive experience accumulated in their scientific and technological cooperation and guided by the desire to ensure further progress in this important sphere of their mutual relations, the two Sides decided to extend such cooperation to the following new areas.

Energy

Taking into consideration the growing energy needs of industry, transportation and other branches of the economies of both countries and the consequent need to intensify scientific and technical cooperation in the development of optimal methods of utilizing traditional and new sources of energy, and to improve the understanding of the energy programs and problems of both countries, the two Sides concluded an agreement on cooperation in the field of energy. Responsibility for the implementation of the Agreement is entrusted to a US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in Energy, which will be established for that purpose.

Housing and Other Construction

The two Sides signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of housing and other construction. The aim of this Agreement is to promote the solution by joint effort of problems related to modern techniques of housing and other construction along such lines as the improvement of the reliability and quality of buildings and building materials, the planning and construction of new towns, construction in seismic areas and areas of extreme climatic conditions. For the implementation of this Agreement there will be established a Joint US-USSR Committee on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction which will determine specific working programs.

For the purpose of enhancing the safety of their peoples living in earthquake-prone areas, the two Sides agreed to undertake on a priority basis a joint research project to increase the safety of buildings and other structures in these areas and, in particular, to study the behavior of pre-fabricated residential structures during earthquakes.

Artificial Heart Research

In the course of the implementation of joint programs in the field of medical science and public health, scientists and specialists of both countries concluded that there is a need to concentrate their efforts on the solution of one of the most important and humane problems of modern medical science, development of an artificial heart. In view of the great theoretical and technical complexity of the work involved, the two Sides concluded a special agreement on the subject. The US-USSR Joint Committee for Health Cooperation will assume responsibility for this project.

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Cooperation in Space

The two Sides expressed their satisfaction with the successful preparations for the first joint manned flight of the American and Soviet spacecraft, Apollo and Soyuz, which is scheduled for 1975 and envisages their docking and mutual visits of the astronauts in each other's spacecraft. In accordance with existing agreements fruitful cooperation is being carried out in a number of other fields related to the exploration of outer space.

Attaching great importance to further American-Soviet cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, including the development of safety systems for manned flights in space, and considering the desirability of consolidating experience in this field, the two Sides agreed to continue to explore possibilities for further joint space projects following the US-USSR space flight now scheduled for July 1975.

Transport of the Future

Aware of the importance of developing advanced modes of transportation, both Sides agreed that high-speed ground systems of the future, including a magnetically levitated train, which can provide economical, efficient, and reliable forms of transportation, would be a desirable and innovative area for joint activity. A working group to develop a joint research cooperation program in this area under the 1973 Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation will be established at the Fall meeting of the Joint US-USSR Transportation Committee.

Environmental Protection

Desiring to expand cooperation in the field of environmental protection, which is being successfully carried out under the US-USSR Agreement signed on May 23, 1972, and to contribute to the implementation of the "Man and the Biosphere" international program conducted on the initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), both Sides agreed to designate in the territories of their respective countries certain natural areas as biosphere reserves for protecting valuable plant and animal genetic strains and ecosystems, and for conducting scientific research needed for more effective actions concerned with global environmental protection. Appropriate work for the implementation of this undertaking will be conducted in conformity with the goals of the UNESCO program and under the auspices of the previously established US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection.

Cultural Exchanges

The two Parties, aware of the importance of cultural exchanges as a means of promoting mutual understanding, express satisfaction with the agreement between the Metropolitan Museum of Art of New York City and the Ministry of Culture of the USSR leading to a major exchange of works of art. Such an exchange would be in accordance with the General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation signed July 19, 1973, under which the parties agree to render assistance for the exchange of exhibitions between the museums of the two countries.

Establishment of New Consulates

Taking into consideration the intensive development of ties between the US and the USSR and the importance of further expanding consular relations on the basis of the US-USSR Consular Convention, and desiring to promote trade, tourism and cooperation between them in various areas, both Sides agreed to open additional Consulates General in two or three cities of each country.

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As a first step they agreed in principle to the simultaneous establishment of a United States Consulate General in Kiev and a USSR Consulate General in New York. Negotiations for implementation of this agreement will take place at an early date.

Both Sides highly appreciate the frank and constructive atmosphere and fruitful results of the talks held between them in the course of the present meeting. They are convinced that the results represent a new and important milestone along the road of improving relations between the USA and the USSR to the benefit of the peoples of both countries, and a significant contribution to their efforts aimed at strengthening world peace and security.

Having again noted in this connection the exceptional importance and great practical usefulness of US-Soviet summit meetings, both Sides reaffirmed their agreement to hold such meetings regularly and when considered necessary for the discussion and solution of urgent questions. Both Sides also expressed their readiness to continue their active and close contacts and consultations.

The President extended an invitation to General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev, to pay an official visit to the United States in 1975. This invitation was accepted with pleasure.

President
of the United States
of America

General Secretary
of the Central Committee
CPSU

RICHARD NIXON

L. I. BREZHNEV

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TOTAL EMBARGO FOR WIRE
TRANSMISSION AND USE UNTIL
DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN SIGNED

JULY 3, 1974

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed to limit underground nuclear weapon tests,

Have agreed as follows:

1. For the Purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the obligations of the Parties under the Treaty by national technical means, the Parties shall, on the basis of reciprocity, exchange the following data:

a. The geographic coordinates of the boundaries of each test site and of the boundaries of the geophysically distinct testing areas therein.

b. Information on the geology of the testing areas of the sites (the rock characteristics of geological formations and the basic physical properties of the rock, i.e., density, seismic velocity, water saturation, porosity and depth of water table).

c. The geographic coordinates of underground nuclear weapon tests, after they have been conducted.

d. Yield, date, time, depth and coordinates for two nuclear weapons tests for calibration purposes from each geophysically distinct testing area where underground nuclear weapon tests have been and are to be conducted. In this connection the yield of such explosions for calibration purposes should be as near as possible to the limit defined in Article I of the Treaty and not less than one-tenth of that limit. In the case of testing areas where data are not available on two tests for calibration purposes, the data pertaining to one such test shall be exchanged, if available, and the data pertaining to the second test shall be exchanged as soon as possible after a second test having a yield in the above-mentioned range. The provisions of this Protocol shall not require the Parties to conduct tests solely for calibration purposes.

2. The Parties agree that the exchange of data pursuant to subparagraphs a, b, and d of paragraph 1 shall be carried out simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, as provided in Article IV of the Treaty, having in mind that the Parties shall, on the basis of reciprocity, afford each other the opportunity to familiarize themselves with these data before the exchange of instruments of ratification.

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3. Should a Party specify a new test site or testing area after the entry into force of the Treaty, the data called for by subparagraphs a and b of paragraph 1 shall be transmitted to the other Party in advance of use of that site or area. The data called for by subparagraph d of paragraph 1 shall also be transmitted in advance of use of that site or area if they are available; if they are not available, they shall be transmitted as soon as possible after they have been obtained by the transmitting Party.

4. The Parties agree that the test sites of each Party shall be located at places under its jurisdiction or control and that all nuclear weapon tests shall be conducted solely within the testing areas specified in accordance with paragraph 1.

5. For the purposes of the Treaty, all underground nuclear explosions at the specified test sites shall be considered nuclear weapon tests and shall be subject to all the provisions of the Treaty relating to nuclear weapon tests. The provisions of Article III of the Treaty apply to all underground nuclear explosions conducted outside of the specified test sites, and only to such explosions.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

The President of the
United States of America

General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

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TOTAL EMBARGO FOR WIRE
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JULY 3, 1974

TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND
NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation
of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions
in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in its
Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons for all time, and to continue negotiations to this end,

Noting that the adoption of measures for the further limitation of underground
nuclear weapon tests would contribute to the achievement of these objectives
and would meet the interests of strengthening peace and the further relaxation
of international tension,

Reaffirming their adherence to the objectives and principles of the Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any
underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons
at any place under its jurisdiction or control, beginning March 31, 1976.
2. Each Party shall limit the number of its underground nuclear weapon tests
to a minimum.
3. The Parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a
solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon
tests.

ARTICLE II

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions
of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification
at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles
of international law.

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2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty the Parties shall, as necessary, consult with each other, make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries.

ARTICLE III

The provisions of this Treaty do not extend to underground nuclear explosions carried out by the Parties for peaceful purposes. Underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by an agreement which is to be negotiated and concluded by the Parties at the earliest possible time.

ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

ARTICLE V

1. This Treaty shall remain in force for a period of five years. Unless replaced earlier by an agreement in implementation of the objectives specified in paragraph 3 of Article I of this Treaty, it shall be extended for successive five-year periods unless either Party notifies the other of its termination no later than six months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. Before the expiration of this period the Parties may, as necessary, hold consultations to consider the situation relevant to the substance of this Treaty and to introduce possible amendments to the text of the Treaty.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
3. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

The President of the
United States of America

General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

TOTAL EMBARGO FOR WIRE
TRANSMISSION AND USE UNTIL
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JULY 3, 1974

PROTOCOL
TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972,

Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to
as the Treaty,

Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the
limitation of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international
peace and security,

Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile
systems will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on
a permanent agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of
strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area out of the
two provided in Article III of the Treaty for deployment of anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) systems or their components and accordingly shall not
exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or its components in the second
of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by Article III of the
Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in
accordance with Article II of this Protocol.
2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the
United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in
the area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III (a) of the Treaty,
and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the
deployment area of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers
permitted by Article III (b) of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system
and the components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed
and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative area
permitted by Article III of the Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of
construction, notification is given in accord with the procedure agreed to by

the Standing Consultative Commission, during the year beginning October 3, 1977 and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years for periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only once.

2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III (a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article III (b) of the Treaty.

3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article VIII of the ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission.

ARTICLE III

The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the Treaty.

ARTICLE IV

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

President of the
United States of America

General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU

#

TOTAL EMBARGO FOR WIRE TRANSMISSION
AND USE UNTIL DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN
SIGNED

JULY 3, 1974

JOINT STATEMENT

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Desiring to limit the potential danger to mankind from possible new means of warfare;

Taking into consideration that scientific and technical advances in environmental fields, including climate modification, may open possibilities for using environmental modification techniques for military purposes;

Recognizing that such use could have widespread, long-lasting, and severe effects harmful to human welfare;

Recognizing also that proper utilization of scientific and technical advances could improve the inter-relationship of man and nature;

1. Advocate the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.
2. Have decided to hold a meeting of United States and Soviet representatives this year for the purpose of exploring this problem.
3. Have decided to discuss also what steps might be taken to bring about the measures referred to in paragraph 1.

Moscow, July 3, 1974

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

The President of the United
States of America

General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

#

LONG TERM AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL, AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Desiring to promote continuing orderly expansion of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation and the exchange of relevant information to facilitate such cooperation between the two countries and their competent organizations, enterprises, and firms on a long term and mutually beneficial basis,

Guided by the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972, the Joint American-Soviet Communiqué of June 24, 1973, and the principles set forth in the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Trade dated October 18, 1972,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties shall use their good offices to facilitate economic, industrial, and technical cooperation in keeping with established practices and applicable laws and regulations in the respective countries.

ARTICLE II

Cooperation which shall be facilitated as contemplated in Article I shall include:

- a. purchases and sales of machinery and equipment for the construction of new enterprises and for the expansion and modernization of existing enterprises in the fields of raw materials, agriculture, machinery and equipment, finished products, consumer goods, and services;
- b. purchases and sales of raw materials, agricultural products, finished products, consumer goods, and services;
- c. purchases, sales and licensing of patent rights and proprietary industrial know-how, designs, and processes;
- d. training of technicians and exchange of specialists; and
- e. joint efforts, where appropriate, in the construction of industrial and other facilities in third countries, particularly through supply of machinery and equipment.

ARTICLE III

In order to assist relevant organizations, enterprises, and firms of both countries in determining the fields of cooperation most likely to provide a basis for mutually beneficial contracts, a working group of experts convened by the Commission mentioned in Article V shall meet not less frequently than once a year to

exchange information and forecasts of basic economic, industrial, and commercial trends.

ARTICLE IV

To promote the cooperation foreseen in this Agreement the Parties undertake to facilitate, as appropriate, the acquisition or lease of suitable business and residential premises by organizations, enterprises, and firms of the other party and their employees; the importation of essential office equipment and supplies; the hiring of staffs; the issuance of visas, including multiple entry visas, to qualified officials and representatives of such organizations, enterprises, and firms and to members of their immediate families; and travel by such persons for business purposes in the territory of the receiving country.

ARTICLE V

The US-USSR Commercial Commission established pursuant to the Communiqué of May 26, 1972, is authorized and directed to monitor the practical implementation of this Agreement, when necessary jointly with other American-Soviet bodies created by agreement between the Governments of the two countries, with a view to facilitating the cooperation contemplated in this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall remain in force for 10 years.

The Parties shall agree not later than six months prior to the expiration of the above period upon measures which may be necessary to facilitate further development of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation.

DONE at Moscow on June 29, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

RICHARD NIXON

L. I. BREZHNEV

President of the
United States of America

General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
3:30 P.M. (MOSCOW TIME)

JUNE 28, 1974

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Attaching great importance to meeting the energy needs of the two countries, with proper regard to the protection of the environment;

Recognizing that the development of cooperation in the field of energy can benefit the peoples of both countries and all mankind;

Desiring to expand and to deepen the cooperation now existing between the two countries in the field of energy research and development;

Recognizing the need to create better mutual understanding of each country's national energy programs and outlook;

Convinced that cooperation in the field of energy will contribute to the overall improvement of relations between the two countries;

In accordance with and in development of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972, and the agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 23, 1972, as well as in accordance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of June 21, 1973, and the General Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation of June 19, 1973;

- 2 -

ARTICLE I

The Parties will expand and strengthen their cooperation in the field of energy on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity.

ARTICLE II

The main objectives of such cooperation under this Agreement are:

- a. to use the scientific and technical potential of both countries to accelerate by cooperative efforts research and development in the areas of existing and alternative sources of energy as well as to increase effectiveness in the use of energy and its conservation, and
- b. to achieve a better mutual understanding of each country's national energy programs and outlook.

ARTICLE III

1. Cooperation will be implemented in the following areas:
 - a. technologies concerning the exploration, extraction, processing and use of fossil fuels, including but not limited to oil, shale, natural gas and coal, and, in particular, new methods of drilling and of increasing the rate of extraction and degree of recovery of oil and natural gas from strata, and of mining, extracting and processing coal and shale;
 - b. the exchange of relevant information, views and methods of forecasting concerning the natural energy programs and outlooks of the respective countries, including all questions of mutual interest related to production, demand and consumption of the major forms of fuels and energy;

- c. technology for developing non-conventional sources of energy, such as solar and geothermal energy and synthetic fuels;
 - d. energy-related environmental technology; and
 - e. measures to increase the efficiency of energy use and to restrain demand.
2. Other areas of cooperation may be added by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE IV

1. Cooperation between the Parties may take the following forms:
- a. exchange of scientists and specialists;
 - b. exchange of scientific and technical information, documentation and results of research;
 - c. establishment of groups of experts for the planning and execution of joint research and development programs;
 - d. joint work by theoretical and experimental scientists in appropriate research centers of the two countries; and
 - e. holding joint consultations, seminars and panels.
2. Other forms of cooperation may be added by mutual agreement.
3. Cooperation under this Agreement will be carried out in accordance with the laws and regulations of the respective countries.

ARTICLE V

1. In furtherance of this Agreement, the Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate and monitor the development of contacts and cooperation between organizations, institutions and firms of the respective countries, including the conclusion, as appropriate, of implementing agreements for carrying out cooperative activities under this Agreement.

- 4 -

2. To assure fruitful development of cooperation, the Parties will render every assistance for the travel of scientists and specialists to areas of the respective countries appropriate for the conduct of activities under this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

1. For implementation of this Agreement, there shall be established a US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Energy. Meetings of the Joint Committee will be convened once a year in the United States and the Soviet Union alternately, unless otherwise mutually agreed.

2. The Joint Committee shall take such action as is necessary for effective implementation of this Agreement including, but not limited to, consultations on the energy situation and outlook of the respective countries; approval of specific projects and programs of cooperation; designation of appropriate participating organizations and institutions responsible for carrying out cooperative activities; and making recommendations, as appropriate, to the two Governments. The Joint Committee shall establish the necessary working groups to carry out the programs, projects and exchange of information contemplated by this Agreement.

3. Each Party shall designate its Executive Agent which will be responsible for carrying out this Agreement. During the period between meetings of the Joint Committee, the Executive Agents shall maintain contact with each other, keep each other informed of activities and progress in implementing this Agreement, and coordinate and supervise the development and implementation of cooperative activities conducted under this Agreement.

• 5 •

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to prejudice or modify any existing agreements between the Parties, except that energy projects within the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972 and the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection of May 23, 1972 which clearly fall under this Agreement henceforward will be implemented pursuant to this Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

Unless an implementing agreement contains other provisions, each Party or participating institution, organization or firm, shall bear the costs of its participation and that of its personnel in cooperative activities engaged in pursuant to this Agreement.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force for five years. It will be automatically extended for successive five-year periods unless either Party notifies the other of its intent to terminate this Agreement not later than six months prior to the expiration of this Agreement.

2. This Agreement may be modified at any time by mutual agreement of the Parties.

3. The termination of this Agreement will not affect the validity of implementing agreements concluded under this Agreement between institutions, organizations and firms of the respective countries.

- 6 -

DONE at Moscow on June 28, 1974, in duplicate, in the
English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

President of the
United States

Chairman, Presidium,
USSR Supreme Soviet

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EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
3:30 P.M. (MOSCOW TIME)

JUNE 28, 1974

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF HOUSING AND OTHER CONSTRUCTION

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;

Desiring to develop cooperation in the field of housing and
other construction;

Realizing that a more effective application of new and tra-
ditional building materials and techniques can contribute to more
rational utilization of the resources available to both countries;

Desiring to exchange information and techniques in the field
of housing and other construction;

Believing that cooperation in the field of housing and other
construction offers benefits for both the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Convinced that such cooperation will serve to contribute to
the improvement of relations between the two countries;

Noting cooperation already being implemented in these areas
under existing agreements, and in accordance with the General
Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation,
signed June 19, 1973;

Have agreed as follows:

- 2 -

ARTICLE I

The Parties will develop and carry out cooperation in the field of housing and other construction on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity.

ARTICLE II

This cooperation will be directed to the investigation and solution of specific problems of mutual interest in the field of housing and other construction.

Initially, cooperation will be implemented in the following areas:

- a. innovative techniques for the improvement of life safety, reliability, quality, and economy of buildings and building materials including: organization and management of construction, new methods and materials, and the improved use of traditional methods and materials;
- b. performance criteria for housing and other construction in seismic areas with special consideration of the impact of geophysical conditions;
- c. improvement of construction methods in areas of extreme climatic conditions, such as cold and arid regions, including techniques for erection and finishing of buildings under sustained freezing, and foundation construction under unusual soil conditions;
- d. Services to housing and other buildings, including water supply, waste disposal, heating, lighting, and ventilation, with special reference to combined utility functions; and
- e. planning, design, and construction of new towns.

Other areas of cooperation may be added by mutual agreement.

- 3 -

ARTICLE III

Cooperation pursuant to this Agreement may be implemented by the following means:

- a. exchange of experts, advanced students and delegations;
- b. exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation;
- c. conducting joint conferences, meetings and seminars;
- d. joint development and implementation of research programs and projects; and
- e. other forms of cooperation which may be mutually agreed upon.

Such cooperation shall be conducted in accordance with the constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the respective countries.

ARTICLE IV

In furtherance of the aims of this Agreement, the Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate and monitor the development of cooperation and direct contacts between agencies, organizations and firms of the two countries, including the conclusion, as appropriate, of implementing agreements for carrying out specific projects and programs under this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

1. For the implementation of this Agreement, there shall be established a US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction. This Committee shall meet, as a rule, once a year alternately in the United States and the Soviet Union, unless otherwise mutually agreed.

- 4 -

2. The Joint Committee shall take such action as is necessary for the effective implementation of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, approval of specific projects and programs of cooperation, designation of appropriate agencies, organizations, and joint working groups to be responsible for carrying out cooperative activities, and making recommendations, as appropriate, to the Parties.

3. Each Party shall designate its Executive Agent which will be responsible for coordinating and carrying out this Agreement, and, as appropriate, in their respective countries, shall assure the cooperation of other participating institutions and organizations. During the period between meetings of the Joint Committee, the Executive Agents will maintain contact with each other and will coordinate and supervise the development and implementation of cooperative activities conducted under this Agreement.

4. Unless an implementing agreement contains other provisions, each Party or participating institution, organization or firm shall bear the costs of its participation and that of its personnel in cooperative activities engaged in under this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to prejudice other agreements between the Parties or their respective rights and obligations under such other agreements.

ARTICLE VII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remains in force for five years. It will be automatically extended

- 5 -

for successive five year periods unless either party notifies the other of its intent to terminate this Agreement not later than six months prior to the expiration of this Agreement.

2. This Agreement may be modified at any time by mutual agreement of the Parties.

3. The termination of this Agreement shall not affect the validity of implementing agreements concluded under this Agreement between interested agencies, organizations and firms of the two countries.

DONE at Moscow on June 28 1974, in duplicate in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

President of the
United States

Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

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EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
3:30 P.M. (MOSCOW TIME)

JUNE 28, 1974

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON COOPERATION IN ARTIFICIAL HEART RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Reaffirming the importance that medical science has for mankind today;

Realizing the advisability of further uniting the efforts of both countries in resolving the pressing problems of medical science:

Recognizing the great importance of scientific research and the study of heart disease, which is one of the leading causes of mortality in both their countries as well as throughout the world;

Desiring to expand and strengthen common efforts to promote the development of an artificial heart:

Realizing that the development of an effective artificial heart could eventually lead to a reduction in mortality;

In pursuance and further development of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Medical Science and Public Health, signed May 23, 1972;

In accordance with the General Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation, signed June 19, 1973;

Have agreed as follows:

- 2 -

ARTICLE I

Both parties undertake to develop and extend scientific and technical cooperation in artificial heart research and development on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE II

The cooperation will be concentrated in the areas of research on, and joint development and testing of devices, materials, instruments and control mechanisms which will provide cardiovascular support including total heart replacement.

ARTICLE III

The cooperation provided for in the preceding Articles may be implemented principally in the following ways:

- a. exchange of scientific and technical information;
 - b. organization of joint conferences, workshops and meetings of experts;
 - c. exchanges of specialists and delegations;
 - d. preparation of joint publications and technical manuals:
- and
- e. familiarization with and exchange of technical aids and equipment.

In the course of implementing this Agreement, other forms of cooperation may also be determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE IV

The parties will delegate practical implementation of this Agreement to the US-USSR Joint Committee for Health Cooperation. The Committee shall approve the programs of cooperation, designate the participating organizations responsible for the realization of

- 3 -

these programs, and periodically review the progress of the cooperation.

ARTICLE V

Cooperation shall be financed on the basis of reciprocal agreements worked out by the Joint Committee, using the resources of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of the United States of America and the Ministry of Health of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as the resources of those organizations and institutions taking part in the cooperation.

ARTICLE VI

Such cooperation will be carried out in accordance with the laws and regulations of the respective countries.

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prejudice or modify other agreements concluded between the two parties.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for three years after which it will be extended for successive five year periods unless one party notifies the other of its intent to terminate this agreement not less than six months prior to its expiration.

This Agreement may be modified by mutual agreement of the parties.

- 4 -

DONE at Moscow on June 28, 1974, in duplicate, in the
English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

The Secretary of State

Chairman, Presidium,
USSR Supreme Soviet

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JULY 3, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

INTOURIST HOTEL

10:10 A.M. (Moscow Time)

MR. ZIEGLER: Secretary Kissinger has appeared here before, so I don't think he needs any introduction.

You have all of the material that will be signed today, and the communique. I guess Jerry has explained to you the fact that there was a section inadvertently left out of the communique you have, and apparently he is running off that insert now. I believe he has described those circumstances, so I won't dwell on it.

The Secretary, first of all, will make an opening statement and then take your questions.

Mr. Secretary.

Q Could we have the section read to us so we know what it says?

MR. ZIEGLER: Secretary Kissinger has that section.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But then they will be able to ask questions on it. (Laughter)

Q We don't have one protocol mentioned in the communique.

MR. ZIEGLER: The Secretary will cover that with you and the reason for it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Ziegler said I should entitle this briefing, "The View From Ten Feet Behind." (Laughter) They don't read the pool reports.

I thought I would give you a brief summary of the summit as we see it, and I think the best way to start is to look at it in terms of the press conference in which I tried to explain the purposes of the meeting.

MORE

- 2 -

I pointed out that there are three fundamental purposes in these summit meetings; one, for the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States to exchange ideas and to check assessments about international affairs in general.

The necessity for this arises because as the two nations capable of destroying humanity, they have a special obligation to prevent conflicts caused by inadvertence, by miscalculation, by misassessment of each other's motives, examples of which history is replete.

The second is to see whether they can, by meeting the needs of their peoples and of mankind, construct a network of positive relationships, that will provide an incentive for moderation and for a beneficial and humane conduct of foreign policy.

The second large objective is to prevent the nuclear arms race and the arms race in general from dominating international affairs, and I want to stress again that this objective is no mean goal and one that will occupy American Administrations in the absence of comprehensive agreements for as far into the future as we can see.

It is not only the complexity of the weapons and their destructiveness, it is also the justifications that will have to be used in each country to sustain large armament programs that will, over a period of time, present a major obstacle to the humane or even safe conduct of foreign policy.

And the third general goal is to identify those areas of common interests, either produced by the nonmilitary aspects of technology or by others or by the nature of modern life in which the Soviet Union and the United States can cooperate and thereby create a perspective on world affairs that recognizes the interdependence of events and the fact that isolation and confrontation are, over a period of time, inimical to progress and inconsistent with human aspirations.

Now, in terms of these three objectives, a great deal of time was spent by the two leaders in reviewing the international situation, and I will get into details when I go through the various documents.

There were the most extensive discussions at that level of the arms race that have ever taken place, and with a frankness that would have been considered inconceivable two years ago, indeed with an amount of detail that would have been considered violating intelligence codes in previous periods.

MORE

- 3 -

So, on the issue of SALT, for example, on which I will have more to say in a few minutes, the words of the communique that far reaching and deep conversations took place, are of very profound significance, and in the next phase of the discussions, difficulties cannot be caused by misapprehensions about each other's general intentions and general perceptions of the nature of the strategic environment.

And thirdly, there were a series of agreements, about most of which you have already been briefed, in the field of cooperative relationships.

Now, let me speak for myself about the two areas of arms control and the general review of the international situation.

MORE

- 4 -

With respect to arms control, let me cover first the agreements that have been made and then let me talk about the strategic arms limitations talks.

With respect to the agreements that have been made, there are three, the agreement that neither side will build the second ABM site, the agreement on the limited threshold test ban and thirdly, the agreement to begin negotiations on environmental warfare.

With respect to the first agreement in which both sides forego the second ABM site, you remember that the permanent agreement on defensive weapons signed in Moscow in 1972, permitted each of the two countries to maintain two ABM sites, one to defend its capital, the second to defend an ICBM field provided that field was no closer than 1,300 kilometers to the capital.

The United States at that time opted for a defense of an ICBM field, The Soviet Union opted for a defense of its capital. There were provisions of the number of interceptors and radars that could be maintained at each site, but there is no point in going through these.

The United States and the Soviet Union have now decided to forego that second ABM site and to maintain only the one ABM site that each currently has which is Moscow for the Soviet Union, and an ICBM field for the United States. However, because it was thought desirable to keep some flexibility with respect to which area could be defended, each side is permitted at one time during the course of the agreement and once in a five-year period, to alter its original decision.

In other words, if the United States should decide that it would prefer to defend Washington rather than the ICBM site, we have the option once in a five-year period to move from the ICBM site to Washington and equally the Soviet Union has the option of moving once in that five-year period from Moscow to an ICBM site.

That option, having once been exercised, cannot be exercised the second time. In other words, countries cannot shuttle their ABM sites back and forth between the capital and an ICBM field. Each side, in short, has the option once to reverse its original decision and it may do so once in any five-year period when the treaty comes up for automatic review.

MORE

- 5 -

The significance of this agreement is that it reenforces the original decision implicit in 1972, in fact, explicit in 1972, that neither side would maintain ABM defenses. It makes it even more difficult, if not impossible, to break out of the agreement rapidly, and in turn, the decision to forego ABM defenses has profound strategic consequences which are sometimes lost sight of.

You must remember that the original impetus for the multiple warheads derived from the desire or the necessity to overcome ABM defenses and to make sure that the required number of missiles would get through.

In the absence of ABM defenses, the extraordinary number of foreseeable multiple warheads will create a situation in which such terms as superiority should not be lightly thrown around because they may be devoid of any operational meaning.

The notion of nuclear sufficiency of what is necessary under conditions of no ABM defenses requires careful correlation with the number of available warheads. For present purposes, I want to say that any idea that any country can easily achieve strategic superiority is almost devoid, under these conditions, of any operational significance and can only have a numerical significance.

The ABM agreement reenforces the element of strategic stability that was inherent in the original ABM agreement made in 1972. The second agreement on the threshold test ban prohibits underground nuclear explosions above 150 kilotons and will therefore have the tendency to concentrate that competition in the ranges of the lower yield weapons. The date for its going into effect has been put into the future because a number of additional agreements remain to be worked out.

There remains to have an agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions in which adequate assurance will be given that they will not be used to circumvent the intention of the agreement and there is an agreement in principle that the inspection of peaceful nuclear explosion, among other things, will involve prior notification, precise definition of the time and place, and the presence of observers which is a major step forward in our discussions.

The second subject that will require further discussion is the exchange of geological information which is needed for the adequate verification of this threshold test ban.

MORE

- 6 -

The third area in which an agreement was reached was to begin discussions on the dangers of environmental warfare from the point of view of overcoming these dangers. This is a form of warfare that is in its infancy, the nature of which is not properly understood and which obviously, by definition, can have profound consequences for the future of mankind.

The United States and the Soviet Union, in the near future, will open discussions on this problem of environmental warfare.

In addition to these three agreements, two protocols will be signed on the Standing Consultative Commission and we will certainly make diplomatic history because it will be the first time that secret agreements are publicly signed. The agreements are being kept secret at the request of the Soviet Union because they involve dismantling procedures for replacement missiles under the interim agreement and the ABM agreement. However, they will be submitted to the appropriate Congressional committees upon our return to the United States.

Let me say a word about the Standing Consultative Commission. The Standing Consultative Commission was created in the 1972 agreement, in order to implement the provisions for replacement or destruction of weapons under the two agreements on defensive and offensive weapons.

There is a protocol for defensive weapons, because the United States will have to dismantle some deployments that have taken place at a site which under the agreement we can no longer maintain and the Soviet Union will have to dismantle 15 ABM launchers and associated radars on their test ranges.

Secondly, there is a protocol for offensive weapons which discusses dismantling and replacement procedure under the provisions of the interim agreement where all land based missiles can be traded in for modern sea based missiles and where older submarine launched nuclear missiles can be traded in for newer submarine launched sea based missiles.

These are the two protocols that have been the subject of illuminating exchange that took place just before I left the United States.

It must be understood that it was the assignment from the beginning of the Standing Consultative Commission to work out precise provisions for replacement and dismantling, that for that purpose they had to go into greater technical detail than was the case in the agreement and that two protocols will be signed, one to implement the defensive provisions, the other to implement the offensive provisions.

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They break no new ground, they change no provisions. If I may say so, they close no loopholes, they deal only with the technical implementation of agreements previously reached. They will be submitted to Congressional committees. They are not policy documents. They are technical documents, in implementation of the 1972 agreement, and they are being signed now as a result of work extending over a period of 18 months because it is only now that the replacement provisions are becoming effective due to the fact that the missiles, the ICBM's, did not have to be dismantled until the submarines containing the 741st missile on the Soviet side underwent sea trial.

Now these are the agreements that have been reached.

Now let me say a word about strategic arms limitation talks. As I pointed out, prior to our coming here, the Administration considers the problem of strategic arms limitation one of the central issues of our time. It is one of the central issues because if it runs unchecked the number of warheads will reach proportions astronomical compared to the time when Armageddon seemed near, when there were something less than 1,000 warheads on both sides.

It is important because a perception may grow that these warheads will provide a capability which will not be sustained by any systematic analysis, but because in any event they bring about a gap between the perceived first and second strike capabilities which in itself will fuel a constantly accelerating arms race.

Now the problem we face in these discussions is that under the interim agreement the Soviet Union possesses more missiles, though if you add together the total number of launchers that is to say, strategic bombers, there is no significant gap, and after all, it was not the Soviet Union that made us build bombers, that was our own decision and therefore, an attempt has been made to establish a correlation between the number of MIRV missiles and the number of launchers in which perhaps to some extent the larger numbers of missiles on one side can be offset by a larger number of MIRV's on the other.

The difficulty with this approach has been the limited time frame within which it was attempted to be implemented so that during the maximum deployment period it would not be clear whether any of these limitations would not simply be to provide a base for a breakout when the agreement lapsed.

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Therefore, the two leaders have decided that the principal focus of the discussions would not be on a brief extension of the interim agreement tied to an equally brief MIRV agreement, but to see whether the three factors, time, quantity of launchers and quantity of warheads cannot be related in a more constructive and stabilizing fashion over a longer period of time, that is to say, by 1985.

And in that context, some of the difficulty of relating the various asymmetries in number can be taken care of and a stability can be perhaps achieved in deployment rates that would remove, to a considerable extent, the insecurities inherent in an unchecked arms race.

As the communique says, the two sides will reconvene their delegations in Geneva on the basis of this approach and on the basis of instructions growing out of the summit meeting.

With respect to the review of the international situation implicit in the communique, I think I will confine myself to a few observations and primarily answer your questions.

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The basic purpose of this review was, as I have pointed out, to attempt to avoid miscalculation and where possible, bring about cooperative action.

In Europe, the principal focus were two subjects: the European security conference and the mutual balanced force reductions.

With respect to the European security conference, the United States repeated its position, which is that we are prepared to have that security conference end at the summit level if the results of the conference warrant it, and that we would believe that such a conference, with adequate results, could make a contribution to European security.

That phrase has been used by Western statesmen now for two years, and it will not in itself advance matters until we can define for ourselves what results we constitute justifying a summit conference. We have put that question to our European allies at Ottawa, discussions of it have begun in Brussels, and we hope to be able to have at least a Western answer to this in the relatively near future.

With respect to the Middle East, I will read the part you don't have.

"Both sides believe that the removal of the danger of war and tension in the Middle East is a task of paramount importance and urgency, and therefore, the only alternative is the achievement on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 338, of a just and lasting peace settlement in which should be taken into account the legitimate interests of all peoples in the Middle East, including the Palestinian people, and the right to existence of all states in the area.

"As Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, the USA and the USSR consider it important that the Conference resume its work as soon as possible, with the question of other participants from the Middle East area to be discussed at the Conference. Both sides see the main purpose of the Geneva Peace Conference, the achievement of which they will promote in every way, as the establishment of just and stable peace in the Middle East.

"They agreed that the USA and the USSR will continue to remain in close touch with a view toward coordinating the efforts of both countries toward a peaceful settlement in the Middle East."

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This is the extent of the Middle East section, which will be distributed to you as soon as this briefing is over.

Finally, the communique lists the area of bilateral relations that have already been covered in previous briefings on which separate agreements were signed. In addition to the ones that have been signed, there will be additional cooperation in space and technology of high speed transportation and in the area of environmental protection where both sides will create biosphere areas; that is, areas which are kept free of the encroachment of modern technology to use for purposes of comparison with areas in which major environmental problems are posed.

Now, these are the main outlines of the Conference, and of the agreements that have been signed. They should be seen in the context of what is now and what will remain for the decades ahead, the problem of preserving the peace: namely, that the United States and the Soviet Union make every honorable effort to avoid the catastrophe of war, and every endeavor to improve the lot of humanity, and that for this purpose the regular meeting of their leaders -- which the communique points out can be supplemented for special occasions between the yearly intervals that have been set -- performs an essential role.

I would be glad to answer questions now.

Q Mr. Secretary, doesn't your Middle East section suggest a change in U.S. policy, and doesn't it now advocate the seating of the Palestinians at the Geneva Peace Conference as the Soviets wanted?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Absolutely not.

Q What does it mean then?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What it means is that this sentence about the problem of the participation of others from the Middle East is verbatim, drawn from the original letter of invitation to the Geneva Conference, and it adds not one word to the original letter in which the invitation was extended to the parties that are now at the Geneva Conference.

Indeed, it is a slight reduction from it where it was said that this problem would be discussed in the first stage, and here it simply says it will be discussed at the Geneva Peace Conference.

Q Dr. Kissinger, two questions. One, how did you arrive at the date 1985 on the SALT business as a concluding date or terminating date?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because we couldn't pick 1984. (Laughter)

Q That is what I thought, but I know you will give a more serious answer in a minute. And secondly, what is the nature of the instruction that will be going out to the delegation that will reconvene in Geneva, and approximately when will they start?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We would expect them to start around August 1, give or take two weeks. The date 1985 was picked for the following reasons:

We had been thinking in terms of extending the interim agreement by perhaps two or three years and at the same time coupling with it some MIRV limitations. This presented a number of extraordinarily difficult problems, because we would be pressed in terms of quantity, since a number of our new programs such as Trident are going to be deployed starting around 1978, 1979, and on the other hand, the Soviet Union would be pressed in terms of quality because their deployment of MIRVs is only now starting and the difficulty of making an agreement with a cutoff date of 1979 is when you have gone through all the agony, you have not put a cap on the rate of deployment, most of which will be occurring after 1978, 1979.

So, it seemed to us that by picking a period of 1985, one could take into account the projected programs and put on limitations that would have some operational significance in which in any event would introduce some stability into deployment rates in such a way that it was not each side's perception of the other, that would be driving it into an ever accelerating spiral.

As we were discussing on Sunday, the various ways of tackling the problem, it became apparent that one of the big obstacles was the short time frame which we were considering and that for what we had in mind it was really necessary to look at it in a longer time frame.

On the other hand, when you talk of a permanent agreement, you get yourself frozen into situations in which the technology is so unpredictable that it is very difficult to make reasonable judgments, and this is why the period 1985 was chosen.

It was chosen in the hope, not the assurance, that if such an agreement were reached next year, we would be talking of a ten-year agreement. This is one of the factors.

Q Could I follow that, because it seems important. You talked about the technological explosion in Brussels, I think. Does this not suggest that in the period between now and 1985 you will have one hell of an arms race going on?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. It depends when the agreement is made. As I said in Brussels, and I maintain, that we have about 18 months to gain control of the multiple warheads, control not in the sense of eliminating it, but by introducing some stability into the rate and nature of their deployment.

If an agreement is reached within that time frame, more or less--that doesn't mean down to the last month--then it can make a major contribution to turning down the arms race, to including the problem of reduction to which we attach importance and to bring stability into the strategic equation.

With every six-month period that it is delayed, the problem becomes more complicated, but the point is precisely to avoid what you called the hell of an arms race, and the difficulty, as you analyze the problem with cutoff dates of 1977, 1979, is that both sides will be preparing for the break of the agreement while they are negotiating the agreement, and it became clear that one of the obstacles was that both sides, while negotiating limitations, were also putting themselves into the position of the agreement lapsing and, therefore, having to develop programs that would be pressing against limits of the agreement at the edge of its time period and for that very reason have another vested interest not to have an agreement.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, General Secretary Brezhnev said last night that these accords could have been still broader than they were. First, I would like your comments on that and also whether it is not correct then from your interpretation that one could not say there are agreed guidelines on the MIRV warhead negotiations.

Secondly, on the question of the underground nuclear test ban, could you clarify with some figures what I believe is a fact that the limit of 150 kilotons would permit all continuing underground testing of MIRV's currently conducted by the United States which are considerably below that range and would that not allow the continuance even beyond the target date here of all the projectable of multiple warheads likely to be produced by both sides.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First, the degree of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States has not yet reached the point where the General Secretary shows me the text of his speeches before he makes them. (Laughter) And therefore, I am not the best witness of what he may have had in mind.

My impression from what I have observed is that both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint and that that is not a thought that comes naturally to military people on either side.

Now, by definition, the limitations could have been broader. On the one hand as you know, the Soviet Union has been proposing a complete test ban, but under provisions that are unverifiable and with escape clauses which would make it directed clearly against other countries. And therefore, we have deferred a further discussion of the test ban, which we are not rejecting in principle, which indeed we are accepting in principle for a later occasion. So I am assuming this is one thing the General Secretary had in mind.

The second is, from my description of the SALT discussions, obviously a broader agreement is conceivable. With respect to your question, are there agreed guidelines for Geneva, the idea of extending the time frame arose really only on Monday, and it wasn't possible to work out detailed agreed guidelines in the interval.

On the other hand, certain basic principles do exist and I believe we have made a major step forward in the approach to the problem.

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With respect to the testing, it is not true that all the projected MIRV developments are in the category below 150. Indeed, the enthusiasm seems to run more in the categories above 150, coupled with improved accuracies, but whenever I link these two I get a rebuttal. So I must be cautious. So if we are concerned that one of the threats to stability is the combination and accuracy and higher yields, then in the next phase of the MIRV warhead race, this ban will make a major contribution.

Clearly for the existing multiple warheads the testing has been substantially completed on both sides. We are concerned with the next generation of warheads, not this generation of warheads and with respect to those, it will play a very significant role.

Q May I follow that, Dr. Kissinger?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q On this question of the 150 threshold, just if you can get a little more specific, what will it prevent us from doing that we had planned to do, planned to test and what will it prevent the Soviets from doing that we know they had planned to test?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: To tell you what we know about what the Soviets are planning to do would present major problems of hospitality. (Laughter)

Q We have had some already. (Laughter)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You are supposed to laugh at my jokes, not top them. (Laughter)

I cannot obviously go into what we were planning to do and what the Soviet Union was planning to do. It is obvious that if one of the concerns is the elaboration of strategies that rely on first strikes, and if, to put it another way, the concern of each side is that the proliferation of warheads might make it subject to a first strike, then it stands to reason that with the hardening of silos, it is the increase in the explosive power of warheads together with improved accuracy that becomes of greatest concern and therefore to the extent that those strategies become possible, conceivable or dominant on each side, whatever its previous approach, each side will be driven towards the elaboration of larger warheads on its MIRV's.

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So I repeat, this is addressed to the next generation of warheads, not to the present generation of warheads.

Q What I was getting at there, as I understand it -- and I could be wrong -- we test in miniature, or do to some extent, wouldn't that put us well below 150, below 100 in fact, and do the Soviets do the same kind of testing in miniature or not?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think this is the place, nor can I think of many more convenient places (Laughter) to go in detail into our methods of testing or what we know about the Soviet methods of testing.

It is my understanding that miniature testing is very rarely done, never done with operational weapons, and the concern that has been expressed to us, as we were discussing this, within our government, was precisely the necessity of full scale tests of those categories of weapons of principal significance.

Q Dr. Kissinger, will they be able to test MIRV's on the SS-9 under that 150 kiloton limitation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whenever I describe the characteristics of Soviet weapons to Soviet colleagues, their self-control evaporates. I don't know how they feel when I describe them to American journalists.

It is our understanding that no MIRV's are being put on SS-9's, that they are developing a missile of comparable size which will have a MIRV capability. I am not making a hair-splitting point. The warhead of that missile which we call the SS-18 and in which our judgment is that the testing of MIRV's is in its very early stage, those warheads, in our judgment, would be considerably larger than 150 kilotons and indeed, if those warheads could be driven below 150 kilotons, we would consider it a considerable success.

Q Do you interpret this limitation as in effect to preventing them from MIRVing on SS-9's or SS-18's?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I said, they are not MIRVing the SS-9's. In order to get MIRV's on a large missile, they would have to replace the SS-9 with a SS-18, but that is just a refinement.

Quite honestly I believe they have probably tested the warheads they would want to put on the SS-18 already. However, these have always to be calculated in terms of weight-to-yield ratio; that is to say, at the present state of their technology there may be a limit to the number of warheads of large yield they can put on the SS-18, while with continued testing, the number of warheads could be multiplied very considerably and still maintain the same explosive power, but I don't want to go beyond that. But you have to look at it both in terms of numbers of warheads that can be carried on an individual missile as well as in terms of the explosive power of each warhead and both of them are a function of testing, because testing determines the packaging which is to say the size of the warhead, as well as the yield of the warhead.

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Q Mr. Secretary, will you be presenting to Members of the Congress any indications of a lessening of tensions and the problems with respect to emigration and harassment and have you found any further understanding and receptivity on the part of the Soviet leaders in this field?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was a discussion of the subject -- and I will have to maintain the position that we have previously, which is to say that we believe that the objective which we think we share with those who have other approaches can, in our judgment, be realized more effectively without making it a public government-to-government confrontation.

Q Can't you tell us if anything new has arisen, not what it is, but if anything new has arisen.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will discuss the subject with those who are interested in the Congress after I return, but I will not discuss it publicly, as I have stated consistently.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you sound as though you have, at least for the time being, given up hope for getting a comprehensive SALT agreement with the Soviet Union. Is that correct?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not a comprehensive, but a permanent, and this is not a question of giving up hope, it is a question of looking at the realities of how to move matters forward. We have been operating up to now within the constraint of either a very short term or a sort of permanent agreement.

Now, permanent would have to have review clauses every five to ten years anyway. So, when you talk of 1985, that is about as permanent as you can realistically become under present circumstances.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what is the view of the Government of the United States of the effect on the good will and spirit that this agreement and the others seek to create of the Soviet efforts to interfere with American television transmissions last night?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know the details of the interference with the television transmission, but we certainly don't approve of it.

Q Mr. Secretary, I thought I heard you say at the outset that the underground testing ban -- I may have misheard you -- but I thought I heard you say the underground testing ban included some provision for observers. I can't find it. Can you elaborate on that?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, the negotiations with respect to the verification of peaceful nuclear explosions included an understanding which is not part of the agreement, that the verification of the underground explosions would involve, among other things, the specification of time and place, and the presence of observers.

That, in itself, is not enough, however. It is not written in the document, and you are quite correct in not finding it because this is, I believe, Article III, and Article III simply says it will be negotiated in the earliest time, and I am simply indicating that we did discuss some of the substance of this Article III, even now.

The difficulty with peaceful nuclear explosions, or the inspection difficulty or verification difficulty, is on two levels. Below the threshold level of 150 kilotons, it does not present a problem of magnitude, but it presents a problem of location.

As you know from the agreement, the location of military test sites is specified and geological information is exchanged and also, there is provision, as you can see in the protocol, for calibration shots.

Therefore, we have a substantial degree of confidence within a factor that is very tolerable for military purposes that we will know violations of the threshold test ban as long as the testing takes place at known sites.

A peaceful nuclear explosion obviously will almost never take place at military test sites; therefore, we will have ~~less~~ geological information; therefore, special verification procedures will have to be used.

This is below 150 kilotons. If the peaceful nuclear explosion should be above 150 kilotons, even more stringent requirements exist to make sure that peaceful nuclear explosions do not hide military testing and those provisions frankly have not been worked out, but there is an understanding that they will include the presence of observers.

Q For those of us without a deep background in the arms negotiation, is this then the first time the Soviet Union has -- leaving aside what kind of tests these are -- agreed to on-site inspection?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is correct. But agreed in the form of an unwritten understanding. This does not exist yet.

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Q Sir, does this understanding specify as to whether these observers will be principals of both countries or whether they will be third nation observers or perhaps observers from an international body?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This has not been worked out. In the context of the discussions, it was from the two countries, which incidentally is much more reassuring to the two countries than to bring in outsiders, but that is a question that has not been refined.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are we or the Russians currently testing any warheads larger than 150 kilotons?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can't go into great detail about it, but as I said, the trend is clearly in that direction.

Q I didn't quite understand that. What I wanted to get out was, does this merely freeze the tests at the current level, or is it actually cutting the size of it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I pointed out, because there is no sense in misleading anybody, obviously the warheads for the current generation have been substantially tested almost certainly by both sides. What will be affected is the improved packaging of new generations or the improved yield of new generations, not of missiles necessarily, but of warheads.

In that sense, without going into the testing programs, I think it is correct to say that the trend of the arms race is in the direction of the higher yields, for reasons which I gave you.

Q What about the problem of decoupling?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The problem of decoupling, I think has been insofar as it can be, taken care of by the exchange of geological information and by the calibration shots.

Q I am kind of puzzled how you can take what happened here on SALT as anything less than a setback. If you have changed from searching for a permanent agreement to searching for one in a finite time period, and you postponed the time you have given yourself, or you have put back the time you have given yourself to find that agreement. It seems to me there are two setbacks there, and I don't see how you can say this hasn't been a failure at the summit.

Q We couldn't hear the question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is just as well. (Laughter) The question is how we can construe SALT as anything other than a setback because we extended the time period for negotiation and we shortened the time period of the agreement to be reached.

Is that correct?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you approach it in a formalistic way, then these are valid arguments. If you approach it from the point of view of what will in fact contribute to slowing down the arms race, then I believe that we have found an approach in which the factors that have inhibited progress can be hopefully overcome.

The difficulty with the previous negotiations has been that it has proved extremely difficult to reconcile the various asymmetries that exist in the design of the forces, in the locations of the forces and in the relative deployment rates of the forces. And the time limits we have been talking about until this visit, created a situation in which both sides would be pressing against the limits of the agreement at the precise moment of its expiration date, the Soviet Union from the point of view of quality, the United States from the point of view of quantity; and therefore, there was a great danger that the mere expiration date might fuel, especially in its final phases, a race.

And as a result of the discussions that took place Sunday, where for the first time, I believe, at least where the concerns and the perceptions of both sides were put before each other in what I considered an unusually frank way, and in which it turned out that the perceptions by each side of the other really was remarkably close -- the only difference being that each side of course has to take the worst case of what the other one might do; I think this was the major gap that existed -- it became apparent that the time pressure was a greater factor than had been commonly understood by either side.

So, I don't want to do this in terms of setback. We are not running a race with ourselves. This is a problem which I have been stressing will be with us for a long time and it shouldn't be seen in terms of hitting a home run on any one occasion.

Q You, at the Brussels briefing, said there was only 18 months before their decisions were irrevocable and each six months made it worse in terms of the rate of deployment.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right and I have reaffirmed that here.

Q But what I mean is you introduced the time pressure as you call it.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are two time factors, the time factor available for negotiation and the time factor involved in the length of the agreement. I have reaffirmed here that in my judgment the time frame in which the problems that I have identified can be constructively settled is in the 18 month range -- 24 months, 18 months -- in that range, and one of the reasons for 1985 is that if this agreement were to be concluded in '75, it would then take care of the next decade. This was one of the reasons behind it.

So that time factor still exists and that time factor will press on us and must press on us if we are serious.

Q Can I follow up on that, sir? What would you envision will happen then if the interim agreement expires or is allowed to expire in 1977 but you have not yet reached a replacement agreement -- what will happen between 1977 and 1985 in terms of the arms race psychology?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If we have not reached an agreement well before 1977, then I believe you will see an explosion of technology and an explosion of numbers at the end of which we will be lucky if we have the present stability; in which it will be impossible to describe what strategic superiority means. And one of the questions which we have to ask ourselves as a country is what in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?

But my prediction would be that if we do not solve this problem well before, in my judgment, the end of the expiration of the agreement, we will be living in a world which will be extraordinarily complex, in which opportunities for nuclear warfare exist that were unimaginable 15 years ago at the beginning of the nuclear age, and that is what is driving our concern, not the disputes that one reads in the day-to-day --

Q One last point, on the weather modification, sir, could you clarify? You only referred to it very briefly. Weather modification techniques, as I understand, proved a failure in the Vietnam war. Could you explain why the issue is regarded as significant in arms control?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the issue is significant because the problem exists. And it is not a problem, frankly, that we have completely understood. We have just started our studies on the subject. How significant it is, frankly, will become apparent only as time goes on. It is significant for the determination of the two sides to try to limit new areas of arms competition.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END (AT 11:15 A.M. Moscow Time)